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VIEWPOINT
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR NIGHTTIME, NO-KNOCK DRUG




It is my pleasure to accept the LAw REVIEW's invitation to
examine a recent North Dakota Supreme Court case. (I only had
to ask them once to invite me.) As explained previously by the
Editor, this new Viewpoint feature provides an opportunity to
comment on recent North Dakota legal developments with short,
"op-ed" type comments by, members of the bench and bar. If
readers accept the LAw REVIEW's invitation to respond to this
Viewpoint, or to write their own, the resulting debate can add a
new perspective on the work of the most important court in North
Dakota.'
Choosing a recent case to view critically is difficult because of
* Professor of Law, The University of North Dakota School of Law, Grand Forks, North
Dakota; Research Director, Central Legal Research, Grand Forks, North Dakota; Municipal
Judge, Emerado and Larimore, North Dakota; L.L.M, 1974, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts; J.D., 1970, University of Texas, Austin, Texas; B.A., 1967,
University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.
1. The kind of written debate I have in mind is not without precedent in this review.
In 1982, the LAw REVIEW invited me to write Perspectives on State v. Nagel: The North
Dakota Supreme Court's Discordant Medley of Fourth Amendment Doctrines, 58 N.D. L.
REV. 727 (1982), and I enticed Bruce Quick, a North Dakota attorney, to write a
corresponding piece on the same case, Reflections on State v. Nagel. The State's
Perspective, 58 N.D. L. REV. 745 (1982). Some years later, I audaciously shared some
thoughts about the exclusionary rule and search and seizure. Thomas M. Lockney, An
Open Letter to the North Dakota Attorney General Concerning Search and Seizure Law
and the Exclusionary Rule, 62 N.D. L. REV. 17 (1986). Soon after its publication, I received
an excellent critique in a letter from Minot lawyer Neven Van de Streek, which the LAW
REVIEW willingly published. Neven Van de Streek, A Response to the Proposed
Establishment of an Administrative Agency to Create and Enforce Rules Regulating Police
Conduct, 62 N.D. L. REV. 223 (1986).
To those who maintain that such writing is not "serious" enough, I recommend Fred
Rodell's classic Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936). Rodell found only two
things wrong with traditional law review writing: its content and its style! Id. at 38. I make
no claim to useful or important content. But I have tried to bear in mind Rodell's
observation that as to "the question of style.... it seems to be a cardinal principle of law
review writing and editing that nothing may be said forcefully and nothing may be said
amusingly." Id.
One of my efforts at iconoclasm was rejected by the editors. The Bluebook now
recognizes the practitioners' use of "Court" in its capitalization rules for the court to which
a document is submitted. Assuming nobody reading a NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Viewpoint reviewing a North Dakota Supreme Court case in the annual North Dakota
Supreme Court Review would confuse my references to our North Dakota Supreme Court
with references to the United States Supreme Court, I wrote this article capitalizing
"Court" to refer to the North Dakota Supreme Court to distinguish it from the trial courts
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the high quality of the current court demonstrated by its decisions
and opinions.2 After reviewing many recent cases, a I elected to
of our state. The editors, however, refused to allow me to pay that homage to the victims of
my critique.
2. No longer do we have such easy targets as State v. Wetsch, 304 N.W.2d 67 (N.D.
1981). In Wetsch, the Court found admission into evidence at trial of the gun the defendant
illegally possessed in a bar and his confession to be "harmless error" because of testimony
from the barmaid. Id. at 68. Wetsch demonstrated a court misstating the test for harmless
error, thus avoiding a decision under the disfavored Fourth Amendment and the
exclusionary remedy. Although the current court avoids more egregious examples of
discounting the Fourth Amendment, members still occasionally express discomfort with the
exclusionary remedy. E.g., Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 294 (N.D.
1987) (VandeWalle, J., dissenting).
Another favorite from the "old days" is State v. Hanson, in which the court found that a
person taking blood was a registered nurse because a highway patrol officer testified that
she said she was a nurse and she wore a totally white hospital uniform and white shoes,
along with a name tag indicating "RN." State v. Hanson, 345 N.W.2d 845, 848 (N.D. 1984).
To be fair, the court held, as with most evidentiary matters, that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in finding that a registered nurse took the blood, and pointed out that
the defendant had not contended the nurse was not a registered nurse. Id. at 850. Perhaps
the court could have relied more convincingly on rule 104(a) of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence, which leaves preliminary questions, such as the admissibility of evidence, to
determination by the court, unbound by the rules of evidence except privilege.
3. I thought I had found my case when I read State v. Deery, 489 N.W.2d 887 (N.D. Ct.
App. 1992). Deery was convicted of driving under suspension based on the testimony of the
car's owner. Id. at 888. The court held that the owner was not an "accomplice" and thus
his testimony was sufficient to convict the defendant without corroboration despite the
accomplice corroboration requirement in section 29-21-14 of the North Dakota Century
Code. Id. at 889. I was curious whether the court would stick to its guns if the question was
accomplice liability for DUI of someone who lends a car to a drunk. I was ready to predict
that result orientation might cause the court's narrow Deery view of "complicity" to
expand, accordion-like, to allow conviction of an "accomplice" who, as a witness against a
principal, is not an accomplice under Deery. But I gave up my "when is an accomplice not
an accomplice" riddle for this "Viewpoint" when I noticed that the court was only North
Dakota's elusive (or is it illusive?) Court of Appeals.
I next considered choosing one or all of the seven cases in the last year or so holding
that reasonable suspicion is enough to justify an investigative stop, usually of an automobile,
even for a traffic offense. McNamara v. Department of Transp., 500 N.W.2d 585 (N.D.
1993); State v. Guthmiller, 499 N.W.2d 590 (N.D. 1993); City of Grafton v. Swanson, 497
N.W.2d 421 (N.D. 1993); State v. Woytassek, 491 N.W.2d 709 (N.D. 1992); State v. Nelson,
488 N.W.2d 600 (N.D. 1992); Department of Transp. v. DuPaul, 487 N.W.2d 593 (N.D.
1992); State v. Kettleson, 486 N.W.2d 227 (N.D. 1992). I also considered two surprising
cases finding no reasonable suspicion to support an investigative stop. State v. Sarhegyi, 492
N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1992); State v. Langseth, 492 N.W.2d 298 (N.D. 1992). I am continually
amazed by the fact that although our legislature has clearly limited reasonable suspicion
stops to very specific and serious criminal activity by section 29-29-21 of the North Dakota
Century Code (1991), not including traffic offenses, nobody seems to have noticed. But
other than my amazement, I did not know what else to write about beyond wondering
whether any attorneys have argued the statutory limit to the court. If so, I could speculate
why the court has ignored it. If not, why not? My wonderment and speculation, however,
were for the most part worn thin by my disappointment that nobody else even mentioned
the statute during the debate on the recently failed initiated Measure 6 which would have
gone further than section 29-29-21 by elevating the requirement for vehicle stops from
reasonable suspicion to probable cause.
Because I have primarily written about search and seizure in this journal, I was
tempted to switch from procedure to some very interesting developments in the law of
crimes: limitations on possession crimes (In re K.S., 500 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1993) (finding
that possession of alcohol by a minor, prohibited by North Dakota Century Code section 5-
01-08, means actual, not constructive, possession); In re J.D., 494 N.W.2d 160 (N.D. 1992)
(stating that "control" for purposes of unauthorized use of a vehicle conviction must be the
"directing influence"), and the use of injunctions or court orders to supplement criminal
prosecution as a tool of social control. See, e.g., protection orders under section 14-07.1-02
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focus again on search and seizure and what at first glance seems to
be a fairly run-of-the-mill case, State v. Knudson.4 Despite
appearance, however, I view Knudson as a fascinating example of
the judicial process. A much improved court, in attempting a rea-
sonable accommodation of privacy interests and prosecution prac-
ticalities, purports to impose limitations on the execution of search
warrants at night and without the usual requirement of announce-
ment of authority and purpose. But although the opinion "reads"
well, the appearance of limitation is illusory. I will first try to
explain the court's patent "holding." Then, I will try to dig
beneath the surface of the opinion to figure out what it really
means.
In Knudson, the court first held that the North Dakota Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(c) requirement of reasonable grounds for a
nighttime search warrant supplements rather than contradicts the
drug statute, which omits a showing of special need.5 Therefore,
because of the court's reconciliation of the statute with the rule, a
warrant obtained under the statute also requires reasonable
grounds in addition to the basic probable cause requirement for all
warrants. Thus far, the case looks like a defense/privacy interest
victory. The court next held that the warrant was issued upon rea-
sonable grounds for a nighttime, "no-knock" 6 entry and search.
The main problem is whether there is any substance to the court's
actual requirements as opposed to its high sounding rhetoric that
something special, more than the probable cause necessary for any
drug warrant, is necessary to justify a nighttime as well as a no-
knock warrant.
of the North Dakota Century Code, orders authorized by the 1993 legislature against
disorderly conduct, and the new crime of stalking. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-31.2-01 and
17-07.1 (Supp. 1993); State v. Franck, 499 N.W.2d 108 (N.D. 1993) (articulating that even an
irregular or erroneous injunction must be obeyed while in force, and that the defendant
had adequate notice of an injunction given over a police bullhorn); Fargo Women's Health
Org., Inc. v. Lambs of Christ, 488 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1992) (stating that although equity does
not restrain crimes, it may enjoin criminal acts connected with violation of legal rights, but
injunctions are subject to constitutional limitations such as vagueness and overbreadth).
Both the limits on possession crimes and the civil alternatives to crimes, however,
seemed too complex for the type of commando raid, hit-and-run essay I anticipated for this
new Viewpoint feature. My prediction is that because criminal convictions are by design
and tradition difficult (as demonstrated by the possession cases), the use of the civil law will
continue to expand as a means of social control (demonstrated by the injunction statutes
and cases).
4. 499 N.W.2d 872 (N.D. 1993).
5. State v. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d 872, 874 (N.D. 1993) (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-
03-1-32(2) (1991)).
6. "No-knock" is used as a shorthand for a search executed by an entry, by force if
necessary, without the usual requirement of announcement of the executing officer's
authority and purpose. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-08 (1991); State v. Sakellson, 379
N.W.2d 779, 782 (N.D. 1985).
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II. STATE V. KNUDSON, BRIEFLY
In order to be clear about what the court actually held, let's
expand the summary in the last paragraph with an old-fashioned
law school style case "brief."
7
Facts
Defendant was convicted of drug possession with
intent to deliver and related crimes. He pled guilty, con-
ditioned on his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress evidence. The evidence was obtained pursuant
to a warrant authorizing the nighttime, no-knock search
of his home.
A police officer testified one evening before the issu-
ing magistrate that a confidential informant had seen "a
number of one-quarter ounce baggies of marijuana in a
plastic container" and firearms in defendant's residence,
and a dog in a kennel near the front door. He told the
magistrate that he was concerned about the firearms and
dog, and that, in his experience, an entry to search for
drugs and paraphernalia prefaced by a knock and
announcement of authority would lead to an attempt to
hide or destroy them.
At 10:48 p.m., the magistrate issued the search war-
rant authorizing a nighttime, no-knock entry and search.
The warrant was executed about 12:10 a.m. the next
morning.
Issues and Holdings
Issue A: What is the standard of review for the denial of a
suppression motion?
Holding A: The standard is whether, resolving all the testimo-
ny in favor of the State, sufficient competent evi-
dence is fairly capable of supporting the trial
court's determination. The trial court has a signifi-
7. This "brief" was added in response to the Editor's request to lay out clearly what the
court did in Knudson. It was first written in the traditional style with separate fact, issue,
holding, and rationale sections, and without footnotes. The Editor collapsed the issue,
holding, and rationale sections, but allowed the omission of most of the footnotes
conditioned upon the observation that all of the statements in the brief (other than the









cant opportunity to judge witness credibility and
weigh testimony.
Was the magistrate's issuance of a nighttime war-
rant proper?
Yes.
What justification, if any, is necessary to obtain a
nighttime warrant for drugs in light of the general
reasonable cause requirement of Rule 41(c) of the
North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
absence of any stated condition for a nighttime
search for controlled substances under section 19-
03.1-32(2) of the North Dakota Century Code?
Rule 41(c) supplements the drug statute by provid-
ing a standard, reasonable cause (which equals
probable cause), for the magistrate's decision. The
court has rule-making authority under the state
constitution and its rules of procedure prevail over
legislative rules. The court prefers harmony over
conflict, and thus read Rule 41(c) as supplement-
ing the statute by providing the issuing magistrate
with a necessary benchmark (probable cause) for
careful consideration by magistrates issuing night-
time warrants.
If required, was there sufficient justification in this
case?
Yes. The magistrate carefully considered the issue
and found probable cause for a nighttime search
for drugs. The magistrate gave careful considera-
tion to the issue and was satisfied that the drugs
probably would have been moved or destroyed.
The court has taken judicial notice of the easy dis-
posability of drugs, and here there was a "relative-
ly" small quantity. The affiant officer's concern
about the presence of firearms and a dog was prop-
erly given little, if any, weight by the magistrate,
who "doubtless" recognized the court's earlier ob-
servation in State v. Sakellson. I Sakellson declared
that unannounced entries increase the potential
8. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d at 875 (citing State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 782 (N.D.
1985)).
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Issue C:
Holding C:
for violence by provoking surprised occupants into
taking defensive measures they would forego if
they knew an officer had a warrant to search the
home.9
Was there probable cause to believe that notice of
police authority and purpose (the "knock" of so-
called no-knock warrants plus an announcement)
prior to entry for execution of the warrant would
result in easy and quick destruction of the evi-
dence or danger to life or limb justifying a no-
knock warrant under North Dakota Century Code
19-03.1-32(3)?
Yes. Probable cause existed because of judicial no-
tice that drugs are typically and easily disposed of
at the first sign of police. No-knock warrants are
available in drug cases because the court has taken
judicial notice that drug possessors "ordinarily are
on the alert to destroy the typically easily disposa-
ble evidence quickly at the first sign of a law en-
forcement officer's presence." In State v. Loucks, 10
the court upheld a no-knock warrant because mari-
juana had been seen at the defendant's apart-
ment." The court declined the defendant's invita-
tion to overrule Loucks which he conceded dis-
posed of his argument.
III. CRITIQUE
On the surface, the opinion appears to make sense. On closer
inspection, it is less convincing.
A. DEFERENCE TO THE TRIAL COURT
It is understandable that evidentiary conflicts will be resolved
on appeal in favor of the trial court's decision with deference to its
better opportunity to determine credibility and weight. But there
is nothing in Knudson to suggest that any testimony before the
trial court was controverted. In the procedural context of this
appeal, it is fair to assume that the only relevant "testimony" was
that of the affiant officer before the magistrate, not the trial court,
9. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d at 782.
10. 209 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1973).
11. State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772, 777-78 (N.D. 1973).
618 [Vol. 69:613
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to support the warrant. Assuming that the court's statement of
facts accurately summarizes that testimony, aren't the primary
issues both at the suppression hearing and on appeal legal ques-
tions about the sufficiency of those facts to warrant the police
actions? If not "pure" legal questions, aren't they at least mixed
questions of law and fact, requiring less deference to the trial court
or magistrate? But, as usual, this "issue" is just a warm-up for the
main events.
B. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR NIGHTrIME SEARCH FOR DRUGS
= PROBABLE CAUSE FOR A SMALL QUANTITY
The court attaches significance to magistrates' needs for a rea-
sonable grounds/probable cause benchmark to determine
whether a nighttime warrant is justified. 12 But how hard will it be
to show probable cause for a nighttime warrant? In Knudson, the
court found probable cause in the "relatively small quantities of
drugs"'l3 which the magistrate and court assumed could, and thus
probably would, be easily and quickly removed or destroyed.
From what the court tells us in the opinion, however, we
know only that the small quantity was "a number of one-quarter
ounce baggies of marijuana in a plastic container."'1 4 We are also
told that the magistrate carefully considered the issue and
expressly authorized the nighttime execution. 15 The actual basis
for the magistrate's decision, however, is never explained.
Instead, we are told that the magistrate "properly" discounted the
police fear of violence because of the presence of firearms and a
dog.' 6 "Doubtless, the magistrate recognized that 'an unan-
nounced entry by officers increases the potential for violence by
provoking defensive measures a surprised occupant would other-
wise not have taken had he known that the officers possessed a
warrant to search his home.' ,,
In other words, we are told only that the magistrate properly
discounted one reason for issuing a no-knock warrant. A reason
not to issue a no-knock warrant is a strange basis for explaining the
reason for a nighttime entry. How is the magistrate's discounting
of a reason for one police action evidence of sufficient considera-
12. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d at 874.
13. Id. at 875.
14. Id. at 873.
15. Id. at 875.
16. Id. at 875.
17. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d at 875 (quoting State v. Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 782
(N.D. 1985)).
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tion for another? Why did the magistrate believe that this partic-
ular plastic container containing a "number" of baggies would
disappear before morning? We cannot determine reasonableness
without knowing the reason.
Perhaps it is unnecessary to describe any careful consideration
or reasoning by the magistrate. The court reminds us that it has
previously indicated that evidence which may be quickly and eas-
ily disposed of justifies a nighttime search and that judicial notice
may be taken of the fact "that drugs are such evidence."' 8 Thus, it
would seem that the careful consideration required of a judge try-
ing to determine "probable cause" for a nighttime warrant
involves nothing more than reference to the predicate determina-
tion for all drug search warrants-probable cause to search for
drugs.
To review, first the court determines that Rule 41(c)'s reason-
able cause requirement must be read into the drug statute to pro-
vide magistrates with a "benchmark" or "lodestar," without which
their consideration of the request for a nighttime warrant would
be an "empty gesture."' 9 The necessity for such a standard is
coherence with the court's own "recognition that 'nighttime
searches constitute greater intrusions on privacy than do daytime
searches.' "20 But the standard turns out to be no more than judi-
cial notice that drugs are quickly and easily disposable.
In a footnote, the court adds:
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals suggests that the
barometer of the reasonableness of "no-knock entries
based upon a general or blanket judgment that contra-
band such as drugs will otherwise be destroyed," is the
quantity of drugs suspected to be at the structure to be
searched. The Court cogently observed that "[i]t is rea-
sonable for police officers to assume that suspects selling
illegal drugs in small quantities from a residence that has
normal plumbing facilities will attempt to destroy those
drugs if officers knock before a search warrant is exe-
cuted .... On the other hand, a blanket rule permitting
no-knock search warrants in all drug cases, regardless of
whether the forms and quantities suspected to be present
can be readily destroyed, is patently unjustifiable and
18. Id. (citing State v. Borden, 316 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1982)).
19. Id. at 874.
20. Id. at 874 (quoting State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533,538 (N.D. 1979)).
620 [Vol. 69:613
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would invite unnecessarily violent and intrusive execu-
tion of many search warrants."' 
1
Perhaps the court is hinting, with this footnote and its description
of the drugs sought as a "relatively" small quantity, that it now
imposes a small-quantity limit to what previously looked very
much like a blanket authorization for nighttime warrants in all
drug cases. However, at least two formidable obstacles make that
potential limitation problematic.
First, the quoted language from the Eighth Circuit case
describes a rationale for no-knock entries, not nighttime entries.
Whatever fear justifies a quick entry without notice to prevent an
even quicker disposal by a simple flush, my assumption about resi-
dential plumbing is that it works the same in the daytime as at
nighttime. That is, the rationale stated for the no-knock entry
does not seem to have anything to do with the time of the entry.
Second, if the court is impressed with a presumption of "care-
ful consideration" by the magistrate,2 2 shouldn't we expect some-
thing more careful or precise from the court itself in its
formulation of a small quantity rule? In discussing the magistrate's
careful consideration, the court mentions that it was "bolstered by
the relatively small quantity of drugs. ",23 How small is "relatively"
small? The court cites State v. Borden 24 for judicial notice that
drugs are quickly and easily disposable, without mentioning a
quantity limitation. The court's recitation of facts discloses only
that the informant, "within the past twelve hours, observed a
number of one-quarter ounce baggies of marijuana in a plastic
container.... "25 What is "a number?" A small or large number?
What size container? My experience with residential plumbing is
that it would not take too many plastic baggies of a marijuana-like
substance to clog the toilet.26 Far fewer, in my guess, than might
be contained, for example, in a gallon plastic ice cream container,
not to mention a large plastic wastebasket or an even larger plastic
garbage can.
If, in fact, the baggies were few, or the container was small,
my idea of careful consideration involves a very specific discussion
21. Id. at 875 n.2 (citations omitted).
22. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d at 875 (quoting State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533, 539 (1979)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 875 (citing State v. Borden, 316 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1982)).
25. Id. at 873.
26. I do not claim careful consideration or extensive experience with this particular
factual assumption. The point is that the court focuses entirely on the "quantity" aspects of
the drug while it ignores the "form" aspect, both of which were mentioned in the Eighth
Circuit opinion it cited. See supra text accompanying note 21.
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of quantity and size. Instead, we find judicial notice about drugs.
Whatever cogency that judicial assumption may have regarding
the efficacy of a knock and announcement, it is difficult for me to
see what it has to do with the necessity for the nighttime execution
of that warrant, with or without a knock. Moreover, despite its
ability to "notice" the disposability of drugs in general, the court
displays no recognition of the fact that some drugs, for example
marijuana in baggies, are significantly less compact and flushable
than, for example, heroin or cocaine. Given the differences in
composition and disposability for various controlled substances,
coupled with differences in value and severity of punishment, fail-
ure to distinguish "drugs" is also an indication of the categorical or
generic nature of the probable cause determination the court in
fact, rather than in rhetoric, provides as its "benchmark" for the
magistrate's decision.
But perhaps the court was consciously or unconsciously assum-
ing that the drugs were likely to be either smoked, sold, or moved
out of the house before morning, not flushed down the toilet.
Again, there is nothing to indicate why that was probable. Maybe
the court knows something special it did not tell us about the noc-
turnal habits of Bismarck marijuana users.
Is the court now also taking judicial notice of the fact that peo-
ple possessing small quantities of marijuana are particularly likely
to smoke, sell, or move their residential marijuana while others
sleep? If the testimony before the magistrate disclosed something
about the defendant's daily routine, the opinion gives us no hint
what that information was. Thus, we have no specific basis for
evaluating the probability of disappearance of the marijuana
except the court's blanket notice that drugs are easily and quickly
disposed of, especially "relatively" small quantities. But why does
the fact they can be easily and quickly destroyed or moved, with-
out more, make it probable that they will be destroyed or moved
during that particular night?
To summarize the nighttime issue: we only know from the
opinion that with "relatively small quantities" of drugs (a number
of small quarter-ounce bags in a plastic container), the magistrate
was convinced the drugs might disappear. But we don't know
why. If there was additional evidence about the defendant's
household and plans for that evening or usual pattern of nighttime
activity, we are not told about it. Without such evidence, we have
a very sweeping rule: A "presumption" of careful consideration
exists in any case involving an unspecified, but relatively small
622 [Vol. 69:613
quantity of drugs. If that's not a "blanket" rule, it certainly looks
to me like a heavy flannel sheet.
C. THE NO-KNOCK AUTHORIZATION
After relying on discussions of no-knock warrants to ratify the
magistrate's determination of grounds for nighttime execution,
the court turned to the issue of no-knock authorization for the
warrant.2 7 No-knock warrants are allowed under section 19-03.1-
32(3) of the North Dakota Century Code when the magistrate is
shown probable cause to believe that notice prior to entry might
cause evidence to be "easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of,
or that danger to the life or limb of the officer or another may
result .... 28
After citing the statute and observing its dual rationale for no-
knock entries, preserving both officers and evidence, the court
never mentions the police fear of firearms and the presence of a
dog discounted in its prior discussion of the nighttime issue.29
Instead, the court again relies on its 1973 decision in State v.
Loucks, permitting magistrates "'to take judicial notice of the fact
that drugs are easily disposed of.' "30 The court expressly declined
the defendant's urging to overrule Loucks; instead, it declared
that the "relatively small quantity of drugs raised the specter of
the quick and easy disposability of evidence. "31
The court observes that an unannounced entry might provoke
defensive measures by surprised occupants in its discussion of the
nighttime issue and then ignores the police fear of firearms and a
dog when discussing the no-knock issue. It does seem plausible
that an announced entry may, in some situations, increase the
danger of violence. Otherwise, the legislative inclusion of "dan-
27. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d at 876.
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-32(3) (1991).
29. I'm not disagreeing categorically with the court's concern for the possibility that
unannounced entries may sometimes increase the danger of violence by provoking defense
by a surprised occupant. See supra text accompanying notes 8, 9, and 17, quoting State v.
Sakellson, 379 N.W.2d 779, 782 (N.D. 1985). Instead, I am pointing out that neither the
danger rationale nor the destruction rationale, as applied by the court, requires a specific,
case-by-case evaluation of particular situations, notwithstanding the court's benchmark,
probable cause rhetoric. It is remarkable that the testifying police officer's concern for the
presence of the dog and firearms is never mentioned in the court's discussion of the no-
knock issue itself. As the court presumes or notices drugs are quickly and easily disposable,
it also seems to presume that no-knock entries are as dangerous, or more dangerous, than
announced entries. The point is that case-specific evidence of either disposability or
danger, not presumptions, is required for a meaningful check on intrusive execution of
warrants.
30. Knudson, 499 N.W.2d at 876 (quoting State v. Borden, 316 N.W.2d at 93, 97 (N.D.
1982) and Borden's espousal of State v. Loucks, 209 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1973)).
31. Id.
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ger to the life or'limb of the officer or another" in section 19-03.1-
32(3) of the North Dakota Century Code would itself be the kind
of idle act or useless gesture the court thinks it avoids by reading a
reasonable-cause standard into the nighttime provision of subsec-
tion (2).32 Since the court does not tell us in its no-knock discussion
why the fear in Knudson was insufficient, we can only guess that it
will approve of no-knock warrants only when presented with
probable cause to believe that the particular resident will more
likely respond to a knock violently than an unannounced entry.
What kinds of cases might that involve? Specific evidence of
prior violence against police presents the clearest, and, I hope,
rare case. Absent specific evidence of prior violence, what factor
is a court that relies on its judicial notice of drug defendants' prob-
able actions likely to consider dangerous? My guess is that it will
involve a large (or "relatively" large?) quantity of drugs.
Let's consider a hypothetical case where the police have rea-
sonable grounds to search for a large or "relatively" large quantity
of drugs. The opinion in that case might read like this:
Because probable cause to search for a large quantity of
drugs also implies a very valuable quantity of drugs and a
more professional type of drug trafficker or serious abuser
in possession thereof, it is reasonable for courts to take
notice of the fact that such large and presumably valuable
quantities of drugs are likely to be defended by armed
and dangerous drug dealers or abusers. We are loathe to
indicate that courts should not give officers who judge
that it would be safer to execute warrants in such cases
without first knocking and announcing their purpose, and
to do so at night, the right to do so, given the specter of
violence raised by professional drug traffickers or people
who consume large quantities of drugs themselves.
Is there any doubt that such an opinion could easily result
from a court that took judicial notice of disposability in State v.
Borden 33 and continues to affirm State v. Loucks?34
IV. GENERAL REFLECTIONS
In my open letter to the Attorney General,35 I suggested the
32. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-32(2) to (3) (1991).
33. 316 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1982).
34. 209 N.W.2d 772 (N.D. 1973).
35. See supra note 1.
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need for clearer rules of police conduct and my belief that the
courts were not likely to provide them. The court has promul-
gated Rule 4 1(c) requiring reasonable grounds for authorization of
nighttime execution of search warrants. The legislature has given
us section 19-03.1-32 of the North Dakota Century Code, authoriz-
ing nighttime entries, which is now supplemented by the court in
Knudson to require reasonable grounds under Rule 41(c), and no-
knock warrants upon reasonable grounds to believe evidence will
be destroyed or people injured if notice is given. Is that clear?
I believe a clearer rule can be deduced from Knudson and
earlier judicial interpretations of the rule and statute. Legend has
it that Thomas Reed Powell, a Harvard teacher of Constitutional
Law, presented his students with his "Restatement of the Law of
the Commerce Clause" shortly after the initiation of the ALI's
Restatements of the Law. It read something like this, complete
with blackletter rule and comment:
Blackletter Rule: Congress has the power to regulate
interstate commerce. The States have the power to regu-
late interstate commerce too, but not too much.
Comment: How much is too much is beyond the scope of
this restatement.
In that spirit, I offer Lockney's Restatement of the North
Dakota Law for Nighttime and No-knock Warrants (try typing that
three times fast):
Blackletter Rule Police seeking a nighttime, no-knock
warrant3" for drugs can have it.
Comment: Police may have a nighttime, no-knock war-
rant for a small quantity of drugs because it is easily
destructible and for a large quantity because of the dan-
ger of armed resistance. How small is small enough and
how large is large enough are beyond the scope of this
restatement.
In other words: the state can't lose! The only time a magis-
trate will need to refuse a nighttime, no-knock warrant for drugs is
for a magic quantity of drugs too large to destroy quickly but too
36. Since this essay is a "Viewpoint" rather than an article, I have not discussed several
important related issues. For example, I have not considered whether a nighttime or no-
knock warrant must always be sought if practicable, whether exigent circumstances might
allow a nighttime or no-knock warrantless search, or whether exigent circumstances might
allow execution of a daytime, knock and announce warrant at night and without knocking
because of developments after issuance.
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small to bother defending by force. This is not the kind of simplic-
ity I had in mind.
In light of the court's reluctance in Knudson to rely on the
danger to officers to justify either the nighttime or no-knock
aspects of a warrant, perhaps my generic rule is a misstatement,
not a restatement. If so, I look forward to a refinement by the
court in future opinions. Perhaps a reader will respond to this
Viewpoint and explain why our courts may take judicial notice
that small quantities of drugs are likely to disappear if not seized
quickly at night, but not take judicial notice that possessors of large
quantities of drugs are probably armed and likely to defend their
drugs. My prediction regarding large quantities of drugs and the
chimerical nature of any intermediate category between relatively
small and relatively large amounts could be countered by a will-
ingness to focus more carefully on particular cases. We will see.
V. CONCLUSION
If I am right about the court's likely approach to large quanti-
ties of drugs, the police will automatically be able to show prob-
able cause for a nighttime, unannounced drug search in virtually
all drug cases. The "benchmark" or "lodestar" the court believes
it provides in Knudson will turn out to be illusory in virtually
every drug search.
But if I predict wrongly about large quantities of drugs and
unfairly criticize the small quantity limit as illusive, the ironic
result will be that the persons least protected by the court's pur-
ported limit on invasive nighttime, no-knock entries will be the
least serious offenders. If so, in the North Dakota drug war, as in
most wars, the little guys will be hit hardest.
The defendant in Knudson claimed that reasonable suspicion
for incrementally more intrusive searches requires a particular-
ized showing of need. The prosecution argued that probable
cause to search for drugs is categorically sufficient. It is troubling
that the court tries to have it both ways by creating a restriction
that prosecutors and police will barely notice.
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